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Introduction
Austin is known as a modern-day American boomtown. In the last 25 years, its population 
has doubled as businesses and residents have moved to the area in droves, drawn by the strong 
local economy, diverse culture, and access to outdoor resources.1 The city’s thriving technology 
sector and growing hospitality and financial services sectors have propelled it to the top of  
numerous “best of ” lists, from Forbes’ “Cities of  the Future” to WalletHub’s ranking of  the 
country’s strongest job markets. The local government—which employs more than 13,000 
people—is also recognized worldwide as an entity that is getting it right when it comes to 
addressing urban challenges. 
Yet despite the numerous accolades, local leaders, including Mayor Steve Adler, have 
acknowledged that Austin’s rapid growth is creating long-term challenges. The city weathered 
economic downturns such as the 2008 recession and the recent oil bust better than others in 
Texas, but it now faces one financial problem that communities from Houston to El Paso are 
also confronting—underfunded public pensions. 
Austin owes nearly $1.8 billion in pension debt, and its pension plans do not have enough 
money to pay for nearly one third of  the retirement benefits that workers have already earned. 
What’s more concerning, however, is that during the last decade, pension debt has grown 
faster than general fund revenue. At the same time, Austin’s pension payments have increased 
dramatically—by at least $81 million.2 While the recent period of  unprecedented economic 
development has helped to mitigate the effects of  the pension debt, it could be much more 
difficult for the city to raise the additional funds needed to cover rising pension payments in 
the future.
The rapid increase in the city’s pension costs is due in part to the fact that the demand for public 
services has soared as more residents have moved to the region. While other strapped local 
governments around the country cut positions, Austin hired more than 1,000 workers between 
2013 and 2016, according to budget documents. As the workforce grew, Austin failed to
1 United States Census Bureau and the City of  Austin. (2016). “City of  Austin Population History.” 
   Retrieved from https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Planning/Demographics/population_history_pub.pdf.
2 There is limited publicly available information about the Fire Fighters Relief  and Retirement Fund’s Actuarially Determined 
   Contributions and actual contributions during the time period studied.
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one third of  the retirement benefits that workers have 
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make its contributions in full to the Employees’ Retirement System, which is the city’s largest 
plan. The underfunding, coupled with a series of  investment shortfalls, has led to a widening 
gap between the plan’s assets and liabilities. As a result, Austin now spends more than half  of  its 
pension payments on debt, rather than on new benefits for workers.
The increase in the size of  Austin’s workforce also means that the city is on the hook for larger 
retirement promises relative to the size of  its revenue. Therefore, the pension debt now poses 
a greater risk to the city’s financial stability. If  Austin experiences an economic downturn in the 
future, it might not be able to keep up with its payments, and the rate at which pension debt 
accrues could accelerate, creating even greater budgetary pressure.
Local leaders only need to look 200 miles north to Dallas to see how quickly unfunded pension 
liabilities can spiral out of  control. In 2014, the Dallas Police and Fire Pension System reported 
that it was in a similar financial position to the one that Austin’s pension system is in now. At 
that time, the Dallas plan reported that it was 75 percent funded, and its unfunded liability was 
roughly $2 billion. In just two years, the debt doubled to $4 billion, and the plan’s funded ratio 
plummeted to 45 percent. Facing significant funding challenges, Dallas has been left with few 
options other than to raise taxes, cut programs, or reduce wages and benefits for workers in 
order to pay down its pension debt. 
Dallas provides an important warning to communities across Texas, including Austin. If  local 
leaders ignore the pension debt, the problem will get worse. Although the issues Austin currently 
faces are not as severe as those in Dallas, city leaders in Austin should take action to improve 
the stability of  the pension plans before the problem becomes too big to fix. Policymakers must 
make reforms now in order to ensure that the pension system remains financially sustainable and 
the city is able to uphold the retirement promises it has made to its dedicated public workers. 
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For years, policymakers across the state, and even around the country, have kicked the can down 
the road when it comes to fixing their public pensions. Some have argued that as long as pension 
plans remain 80 percent funded or close to it, the systems are financially stable. Proponents of  
this view say that the plans have nearly enough to cover what is owed to workers, and moreover, 
the benefits will not actually be paid out until many years later. 
This is simply not true. In a policy brief  titled “The 80% Pension Funding Standard Myth,” the 
American Academy of  Actuaries wrote that “No single level of  funding should be identified as 
a defining line between a ‘healthy’ and an ‘unhealthy’ pension plan.”3 The Academy went on to 
say that it is important to consider a number of  other factors when evaluating a pension plan, 
including the size of  the plan’s promises relative to the government’s ability to pay for them.
The policy brief  underscores an important point about the management of  public pensions. 
Even funds that appear to be relatively stable can quickly find themselves in trouble if  the plan 
administrators fail to deal with pension debt in a responsible manner. For example, the funded 
ratio of  Austin’s pension system, which includes the Austin Employees’ Retirement System, the 
Police Retirement System, and the Austin Fire Fighters Relief  and Retirement Fund, has dropped 
by nearly 20 percentage points in just eight years.
Statement of  the Problem
Austin Pension Plans $1,760 67.0% 100.0% $149 $153 102.7%
City of  Austin Employees’
Retirement System $1,247 63.2% 70.8% $98 $100 102.0%
City of  Austin 
Police Retirement System $385 62.6% 21.9% $33 $33 100.0%
Austin Fire Fighters 
Relief  and Retirement Fund $128 85.9% 7.3% $17 $19 112.0%
Table 1. Austin’s Pension Debt Is More Than Two Times Larger 
 Than General Fund Revenue
Plan
Share of  
Total 
Shortfall
ADC* 
(in Millions)
Actual 
Contribution 
(in Millions)
Percent of  
ADC 
Contributed
Austin General Fund 
Revenue $737 Million
Source: Authors’ calculations; City of  Austin, Employees’ Retirement System, Police Retirement 
System	and	Fire	Fighters	Relief and	Retirement Fund	comprehensive	annual financial	reports;	
              Employees’ Retirement System, Police Retirement System, and Fire Fighters Relief  and Retirement 
Fund actuarial valuation reports; and “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” by the Texas 
Pension Review Board. *Actuarially Determined Contribution (ADC) Note: Although the city has paid its ADC—or the amount it should contribute annually to 
cover	the	cost	of	 debt	and	benefits	for	current	workers—in	full	to	the	pension	plans	in	recent	years,	local	leaders	skipped	payments	to	the	Employees’	Retirement	
System during the mid to late 2000s.
Funded 
Ratio
Pension 
Debt
(in Millions)
3 The American Academy of  Actuaries. (July 2012). “The 80% Pension Funding Standard Myth.” 
   Retrieved from https://www.actuary.org/files/80_Percent_Funding_IB_071912.pdf.
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Given that Austin’s pension debt is more than two times larger than its general fund reve nue, 
local leaders should take the system’s current 67-percent funded ratio as an indication that the 
city could face significant pension problems in the future. In fact, a closer look at financial 
reports reveals that the city’s two largest plans, the Police Retirement System and the Employees’ 
Retirement System, are only 63 percent funded, which is a cause for concern.
One of  the key problems with the system is that the city failed to pay its pension bill in full 
to the employees’ plan during the mid to late 2000s. As the city’s workforce grew, the cost of  
providing municipal workers’ benefits alone tripled. At the same time, the plan’s debt increased 
by 200 percent in a decade. And although local leaders put significantly more money into the 
employees’ fund each year, it was still not enough to adequately fund the plan. Between 2003 
and 2011, the city underfunded the plan by about $170 million. While the city has made its 
contributions in full during the past several years, the increase in funding has not made up for 
years of  poor financial practices. Like making the minimum payments on a credit card, this 
means that it will cost the city much more to pay off  the debt in the long run. 
The underfunding was compounded by the fact that Austin pursued an increasingly risky 
investment strategy as the pension debt and benefit costs grew. At 7.5 percent, the city’s assumed 
rate of  return for the employees’ retirement plan is nearly three times higher than the risk-free 
rate of  return, which means that it is expecting the plan to yield returns that it is unlikely to
Source: Authors’ calculations; Employees’ Retirement System, Police Retirement System, and Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund comprehensive 
annual financial reports; Employees’ Retirement System, Police Retirement System, and Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund actuarial valuation 
reports; “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” by the Texas Pension Review Board; Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 
Public Plans Data; and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note: Adjusted for inflation.
Graph 1. Austin’s Pension Debt Tripled Between 2007 and 2015
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achieve. In fact, in a recent actuarial experience study, investment consultants for the employees’ 
fund estimated that during the next 20 years, the plan has only a 43.3 percent chance of exceeding 
its current assumed return of 7.5 percent and just a 50 percent chance of achieving a 7 percent 
return. Moreover, the employees’ plan only recently lowered its assumptions to 7.5 percent from 
7.75 percent. The police and firefighter funds, meanwhile, continue to use assumed rates of return 
that are above the national average—7.8 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively.
In an effort to meet these lofty investment goals, administrators of the employees’ plan shifted 
more than 17 percent of the portfolio into hard-to-value, illiquid assets like real estate and 
alternatives. This strategy has failed to pan out, however, and between 2001 and 2015, the fund 
averaged returns that were nearly a percentage point or more below its assumed rate. Even these 
minor fluctuations have led to big increases in the city’s unfunded liability, and if any of the plans 
earn lower-than-expected returns going forward, the pension system could find itself in 
serious trouble.  
Furthermore, since the city relies on rates of return that it’s unlikely to achieve in the short or long 
term, Austin’s pension problem could be more severe than local leaders have acknowledged. For 
example, if the assumed rates of return were lowered to 6.5 percent for each plan, the system’s 
total debt would jump to $2.6 billion. 
Yet even at its current assumed rate of return, the city is not projected to pay off the debt held by 
the employees’ plan. In fact, projections show that the plan’s unfunded liability could rise slightly 
in the next two decades. What is more concerning, however, is that if the current economic trends 
continue and the plan’s average rate of return does not improve, debt will likely skyrocket.
Graph 2. Austin’s Pension Debt Will Likely Rise Over the Next Decade
6.5% Return
7.5% Return
7.75% Return
Historical 
Data
Source: Authors’ calculations; Employees’ Retirement System comprehensive annual financial reports; Employees’ Retirement System 
actuarial valuation reports; and “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” by the Texas Pension Review Board.
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The city’s pension contributions to the employees’ plan alone are already equal to 13 percent of  
general fund revenue, while total contributions to the three plans are equal to nearly 21 percent 
of  general fund revenue. Thus, an increase in pension costs could create significant budgetary 
challenges, leaving the city with less money to invest in infrastructure improvements and critical 
public services.
The effect of  market fluctuations on the financial stability of  Austin’s pension system highlights 
a key problem with the way many plans in the state are designed and regulated. Traditional 
Defined Benefit plans require plan managers to make a number of  complex calculations about 
economic and demographic trends in order to determine the amount of  money a government 
must save now to cover the cost of  providing benefits to future retirees. 
Texas has few requirements governing plans’ funding and investment policies, or the financial 
information that plans must disclose. This makes it difficult for taxpayers, workers, and policy-
makers to determine whether pension boards are managing the plans in a responsible manner. 
The problem is especially acute for the 13 plans that are controlled by the state legislature, 
rather than the cities that sponsor them. These funds include Austin’s police, fire, and municipal 
employees’ plans, as well as plans in Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, and El Paso.
Source: Authors’ calculations; City of  Austin and Employees’ Retirement System comprehensive annual financial reports; Employee Retirement 
System actuarial valuation reports; “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” by the Texas Pension Review Board; and Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College, Public Plans Data.
Graph 3. Contributions to the Employees’ Retirement System 
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While each of  these funds is governed under a separate state statute, all of  the statutes include
provisions that limit local policymakers’ oversight and their ability to make changes that could 
improve the financial health of  the plans.
Dallas provides a cautionary example of  how the lack of  local oversight can lead to serious 
mismanagement of  pension systems, and city leaders in Austin should take note of  how quickly 
pension debt can spiral out of  control. Two years ago, the police and fire fund, which is Dallas’ 
largest pension fund, reported that it was 75 percent funded and its unfunded liability was about 
$2 billion. However, the debt doubled after members approved substantial increases to their own 
benefits—a move allowed under the plan’s statute—and the former plan managers made a series 
of  reckless investments that resulted in big losses. 
Given that Dallas does not have control of  the police and fire fund, city leaders had limited 
information about the actions of  the plan’s former leadership. Policymakers, taxpayers, and 
workers were caught by surprise when investigative media reports and an extensive independent 
analysis revealed that the plan was on the brink of  a financial crisis. With actuarially determined 
contributions now at an unprecedented 79 percent of  payroll and the fund facing a potential 
cash shortage, Dallas has few options other than to make draconian cuts to services, reduce 
benefits for workers, or implement tax hikes. 
The dire situation in Dallas should serve as a warning call for cities across Texas. Austin should 
not wait for its pension problems to escalate into a crisis. By making reforms now, the city can 
implement changes that will improve the stability of  its pension plans without compromising the 
level of  service it provides to citizens. Left unaddressed, however, the pension debt will continue 
to rise, placing workers’ retirement security and the economic vitality of  the city at risk.
The dire situation in Dallas should serve as a warning call 
for cities across Texas. Austin should not wait for its pension 
problems to escalate into a crisis.
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Solutions
Austin’s city leaders have demonstrated a commitment to upholding the cornerstones of  good 
governance by promoting financial transparency, prioritizing the delivery of  high-quality public 
services, and making reforms to improve programs and policies. Yet in his 2016 State of  the City 
address, Mayor Adler said that as the city continues to grow, it will face a number of  important 
challenges. Chief  among them will be the question of  how to ensure that Austin is both a 
vibrant and affordable community. 
Without reform, Austin’s pension debt will have a direct impact on the city’s ability to provide 
services and invest in infrastructure and public safety. Policymakers will be forced to devote 
more and more of  the budget to pension costs and may also be forced to raise taxes and fees 
or cut benefits for public workers in order to make ends meet. Thus, any plan to improve the 
financial stability of  the city must address its pension debt. 
Although incremental fixes may help in the short term, going forward, local leaders must make 
comprehensive reforms to ensure that the city is able to uphold its retirement promises to public 
workers. The city must take steps to address the plans’ underlying structural flaws, including the 
problems with its funding and investment policies.
First, the city must make adequate funding non-negotiable and commit to paying 
down its current unfunded liability in 30 years or less. The city should also commit 
to paying down—in 20 years or less—any new debt that is accrued, as recommended 
by the Society of  Actuaries Blue Ribbon Panel on Pension Funding. This will help to 
ensure that the system avoids costly periods of  negative amortization.4
Second, policymakers must establish prudent and realistic funding and investment 
policies that take into account the possibility of  economic downturns and the 
government’s ability to cover lower-than-expected investment returns.
1.
2.
Without reform, Austin’s pension debt will have a direct 
impact on the city’s ability to provide services and to invest in 
infrastructure and public safety.
4 The Employees’ Retirement System board has adopted funding and investment policies. The funding policy explicitly states that 
   pension debt should be amortized in 25 years or less. While having these policies in place is positive, the city’s actual contributions
   are set by state statute and do not necessarily align with the pension fund’s policy.
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It’s important that local leaders take a balanced approach to addressing the pension debt. 
The burden of  paying off  the plans’ unfunded liabilities should not fall on a single group of  
stakeholders, and city leaders should engage taxpayers and workers in identifying fair and 
sustainable reforms that will ensure that the pension system remains financially stable. 
Austin’s pension costs are rising and could present a serious financial problem in the future. 
However, there is still time for the city to implement reasonable reforms that will address its 
funding issues. Austin is known as a city that is committed to finding innovative solutions. 
It should apply this mentality to solving its pension problems and take action now to protect 
residents and the city’s dedicated public workers.
Third, city leaders should seek control of  Austin’s pension plans in order to improve 
oversight and accountability. By establishing local control of  the pension fund, the 
city would also have the flexibility it needs to respond to changing economic or 
demographic trends.
Finally, the city should consider enrolling new workers in plans that are simpler and 
easier to manage, like a Defined Contribution or Cash Balance plan. Both plans can 
be designed to provide workers with a secure retirement while better protecting the 
city’s financial interests.
3.
4.
